ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. NAVY EXPERIENCE.

Raymmond L. Forbes Jr.

Working Paper Series

ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF

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

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ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. NAVY EXPERIENCE

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. Navy has been involved in a massive organization development effort for the past six and one-half years. Begun as the outgrowth of a pilot internal action study group, the Navy program has now reached system-wide proportions. Enjoying the support of top management, it has involved the majority of the Navy's operational units, and is just beginning to work at the senior staff level.

Employing a survey-based approach to planned change, the Navy Human Resource Management Cycle appears to contradict many of the earlier tenets about what constitutes successful organization development. The present effort is semi-structured, mandatory, repeatable, and uses para-professionals as its principal agents of change. It faces a moderate degree of uncertainty in its immediate future and is presently in a stage of retrenchment and institutionalization.

This paper delves into the working of the Navy's pioneer large-system change program, reviews its intimate family history, shares some of its problems and learnings, discusses potential shortcomings, and previews and makes recommendations for its future. It makes a concerted attempt to generalize from the Navy-specific experience to the large system - general application of organization development.

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"In order to reduce the number of taboos that are operative in a system, someone will probably first have to violate them."
(Steele, 1975)

ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. NAVY EXPERIENCE

"Like beauty, the outlines of an organization are in the eyes of the beholder." (Khandwalla, 1977)

By almost any stretch of the imagination the United States Navy is a large organizational system. It is staffed by over 800,000 persons (526,600 military and 310,100 civilians) has a budget that comprises 1.7% of the nation's gross national product (31.5 billion dollars), and operates a tremendous number and variety of capital equipments (467 ships and 6800 aircraft). As a hierarchically structured bureaucratic system it spans over 23 levels of organization from recruit seaman (E-1) to Admiral (O-10). Seen as a complex socio-technical system, the Navy organization spends over 44% of its available funding on personnel (social subsystem) expenditures; the estimated outlay for fiscal year 1977 is in excess of six billion dollars. (U.S. Navy, 1977)

Technologically the Navy relies upon the latest advances in weaponry and support equipment, spending over 3.8 billion dollars a year to fund its extensive research and development programs.

The Navy's broad based mission of national defense requires it to contribute to the strategic nuclear deterrent, maintain open sea lines of communications with the country's allies and foreign sources of raw materials, provide for overseas projection of military power, and to act as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

How does the Navy match up as a large organizational system when assessed against the yardsticks developed by organizational theorists and writers? Many researchers into organizational functioning (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Hunt, 1972; Huse and Bowditch, 1973; and Baker, 1973),

following the lead of the early general systems theorists, have attempted to define organizations in terms of open systems. An open system is characterized by interdependence of its parts and one that is open to matter-energy-information exchanges with a surrounding environment (Kelly, 1974).

The organization-environment interface was most prominently described by Emory and Trist. They (Emory and Trist, 1969) categorized environments into four basic types based upon their causal texture (the degree to which goals and noxiants are changing and the character of their distribution). The first type is a placid, randomized environment. The second is called a placid, clustered environment. The third texture is termed a disturbed, reactive environment. The fourth environment is the most extreme and is called turbulent fields.

Zaltman and Duncan (1977) suggested that the principal characteristics of organizations affecting their susceptibility to change and innovation are complexity, formalization, and centralization. Complexity is concerned with the number of occupational specialties present, their degree of professionalism, and the level of task structure differentiation. Formalization is related to the amount of emphasis placed upon the following specific rules and regulations in performing the organization's work roles or jobs. Centralization is defined in terms of the location of authority and the decision making power within the organization's structure.

Utilizing criteria developed from open systems theory, environmental classification concepts, and susceptibility to change and innovation, the Navy as an organizational system can be more completely defined for analytical purposes. The foregoing criteria, employed as measuring

devices, show the Navy to be an open system; a highly complex, formalized, and centralized organization; and as operating in a turbulent-field type of environment.

This paper is concerned with a brief tracing of the history of the Navy's formal organization development effort, a current sketch of the contours of the present planned change program, a look at the perplexities and puzzles arising from its use, a review of lessons learned, what future implications and directions might be, a short discussion and recommendations section, and a closing summary. The intent of this paper is to inform, challenge, and stimulate further thought about the relevancy of organization development to all types of large organizational systems.

"'How does a place like this get started?' Stanley asked, with a mixture of hope and admiration, thinking that the knowledge might be useful in the future." (Ritti and Funkhouser, 1977)

A CAPSULE HISTORY: A PREVIEW OF COMING EVENTS

The U.S. Navy has been formally involved with organization development since 1971 although informal localized efforts had been initiated several years prior to that time. The primary precipitating factors involved in influencing the start of the effort were the social change pressures originating in the larger American society as well as the advent of a change-oriented Navy top leadership group (Forbes, 1976). This effort has occurred in spite of the prevailing idea among sociologists that the military is associated with a conservative ideology and is distrustful of social and political change (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1976).

In January 1971 at the behest of the Navy's senior uniformed leader, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, a one year pilot program in Human Resource Management was begun. The membership of the pilot group consisted of twenty-four carefully screened, active duty volunteers. Composed almost equally of officers and enlisted persons, the group was charged by the Chief of Naval Operations to "develop and evaluate new ideas and techniques in the human relations area" (Zumwalt, 1970).

The stated objective of the pilot program was to find ways to improve the management of the Navy's human resources as well as to increase the organization's ability to understand and communicate with its people. During the planned life of the pilot program a wide variety of past, existing, and envisioned approaches to accomplishing its broad charter were investigated and analyzed. In the course of the group's inquiry both intra-government and civilian developed programs and

techniques were scrutinized. The final recommendation, the culmination of the program's work, was to propose Navy-wide adoption of an organization development program (Moore, 1971).

Somewhat later Bowers, Franklin and Pecorella (1973), conducting research into organization development under the sponsorship of the Office of Naval Research, suggested that planned organizational development might be a constructive response to a myriad of national level problems.

During March, 1971, while the pilot group was deeply involved in its research effort, a Human Relations Project Office was created within the Bureau of Naval Personnel. The office was to oversee and guide the heretofore largely uncoordinated Navy programs in the general area of human relations. This new activity was specifically charged with overall supervisory responsibility for the Navy programmatic efforts in race relations education, alcohol and drug abuse education and rehabilitation, intercultural relations, civilian transition assistance, and the fledgling human resource management pilot group.

In mid-1971 a senior pilot group member was reassigned to the Project Office to both act as a liaison officer and to assume the duties as the Navy's first Organization Development Program Director. With the dissolution of the pilot group in January, 1972, the project office became the central management point for implementing the recommended system-wide organization development effort.

During the closing months of 1971 a small task group of project office staff and pilot group members met continuously to produce the broad outlines of a full scale planned change effort within the naval establishment. The change strategy design that emerged from these meetings was a synthesis of proven existing organization development

methods (i.e., the Managerial Grid Organization Development System, the laboratory learning approach, the team development method, and the instrumented survey-feedback process) (Forbes, 1976).

related to inducing large scale change. Several of the key decisions were related to:

- Resources. The commitment of scarce money and people on a priority level to a long ranged effort on the basis of largely undemonstrated potential in a time of resource scarcity.
- Program Scope. The establishment of new regional consulting centers geographically positioned so as to provide service to concentrations of operational units on a voluntary, first-come/first-served basis.
- Structure. Maintaining the embryo organization development program as a staff function, under centralized control, as one service among many offered by the regional centers.
- Top Management Support. Continually seeking demonstration of top management support and commitment in the form of obtaining requested resource allocations, protection of program members from hostile organizational elements, public and private endorsement of program goals, and actual participation in some developmental activities.
- Education and Training. The creation of a staff selection and training pipeline to provide the organization development program with a large number (100) of organization development practitioners in a short period of time (one year).
- Evaluation and Continued Development. Initiation of a medium scaled evaluation effort with an operations-oriented subsystem (a cruiser-destroyer flotilla) while continuing ongoing program development and refinement.
- Staffing. The utilization of Navy line management people with limited training to act in an internal consultant capacity vice employment of professional external change agents.

Throughout 1972 the regional consulting offices, christened Human Resource Management Centers, were involved with preparing and furnishing their physical facilities, local marketing of clients for the command development and other programs, administering the seven step organizational development process with those units choosing to become involved, designing workshops and consultation services to support the action planning phase of the change program, receiving and training staff members, and providing progress feedback to the Washington, D.C. based project headquarters. During this period it also became apparent to Navy top management as the program experience base grew that the organization development effort had some serious shortcomings as well as significant strengths.

Major problem areas identified with the Command Development change approach included:

(1) the military appearance and professional expertise of the Navy consultants, (2) the capacity to reach only a small percentage of of the total possible number of client units, (3) difficulties in establishing scheduling priorities, (4) little senior line management involvement and ownership of the effort, (5) broad and diverse interpretations of the activities in the command development process, (6) lengthy time demands upon the client units, (7) overlap and competition with other programs under the auspices of the project office, and (8) no clear-cut program goals or objectives. The central strategy evolved for the resolution of these difficulties was the "institutionalization" of the organization development approach into the everyday working fabric of Navy life.

The strategic mechanism chosen for the achievement of institutional-

ization involved shifting the selection and screening of potential consultants to the purview of the traditional personnel managers utilizing criteria acceptable to line management, the transfer of assets and responsibility for accomplishing change program results to senior line managers (fleet commanders), and the establishment of additional consulting centers along with smaller more localized consulting activities called Human Resource Management Detachments.

The Command Development process was streamlined and more closely structured into an improved time-phased effort entitled the Human Resource Management Cycle, making involvement in the new program mandatory for fleet units. A five day portion of the cycle, called a Human Resources Availability period, was included as a regular component of the routine operational scheduling process. The revised process also integrated delivery of significant aspects of the equal opportunity/race relations, substance abuse education, and overseas diplomacy programs into the cycle itself.

Positions on the senior line managers staffs were created and filled to coordinate their newly assigned human resource management responsibilities. Consultant training responsibility was shifted to the existent Navy formal education system. Overall program sponsorship became the prerogative of the Navy's top line manager, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the principal program resource support role was assigned to the Navy's top personnel manager, the Chief of Naval Personnel.

Human resource management inspection criteria were built-in to the Navy-wide, long established, routine administrative evaluation system. A requirement was levied on all Navy organizations to individually develop a written action plan to address significant organizational issues. A set of intended, top management sanctioned, program outcomes was published throughout the Navy organization.

The staging and management of the institutionalization of the organization development process was orchestrated by the project office. The process involved rough drafting of a comprehensive change document, the solicitation of inputs and comments from those subsystems most affected by its provisions, a joint review meeting, a redrafting, re-commenting, and then final issuance as a formal Navy policy directive from its top management office. The method was conducted throughout in the pattern of the traditionally recognized organization development values of shared power and participative decision making.

The new "cyclic" approach to planned organizational change was primarily targeted at lower echelon operational units with the intent to cover them all in a four to five year time span. Field testing of the Human Resource Management Cycle approach was completed in late 1973 in three locations and approved for fleetwide introduction in January of 1974. The delivery system has remained fundamentally unchanged up to the present time with the exception of evolutionary improvements in the various sequential stages.

"Finally one caterpillar gasped, 'Unless we try together nobody will reach the top. Maybe if we give <u>one</u> big push!'" (Paulus, 1972)

CURRENT DESCRIPTION: SUNSHINE AND SHADOWS

The Navy-planned change approach is called "survey guided development," and is roughly patterned after the organization development consultant model developed by Kolb and Frohman (1970). In its present configuration the program relies upon a survey-feedback change strategy; is primarily aimed at the development of individual units; uses internal consultants as the principal agents of change; emphasizes short and medium term changes, as well as long term payoffs; and strives toward a goal of increased organizational effectiveness. It is also a highly structured, time-bounded, mandatory program managed by the line structure of the Navy. The current directions for the program's administration and operation are contained in several publications available to the individual Navy organization development practitioner (ODA, 1976; Shear, 1975; Franklin, 1974; and Pecorella, 1974). Efforts are now underway to produce a multi-volume, standardized, consultant guidebook.

Using a conventional systems model of organizations (March and Simon, 1958) the present state of the Navy's organizational development effort can be described and analyzed. Hellriegel and Slocum (1977), building upon the work of Leavitt (1964) and others, proposed a comparative typology for assessing organization change models which divides each effort into subsystems of major interacting variables. The major system components include task, structure, technology and people.

° <u>Task</u>. The Navy organization development effort is complex in terms of the diversity and perceived difficulty of accomplishment of the desired program outcomes. These outcomes broadly fall into categories of improved mission achievement and increased human satisfaction

among the organization's membership. This is consistent with the desired outcomes of organization development interventions formulated by Friedlander and Brown (1974) in their comprehensive summary of the research. Organizational outcome measures related to mission accomplishment include a higher state of operational readiness, improved communications at all command levels, chain of command involvement in efforts to increase the productivity and effectiveness of its human assets, and a reduction in the incidence of adverse overseas incidents. Anticipated achievements in the region of human satisfaction are: a better awareness of the Human Goals Credo (a Department of Defense document concerned with promoting equal opportunity and recognition of individual human worth and dignity), an improved image of the Navy as a professional organization, better leadership and human resource management practices at all organizational levels, insurance of equality and uniformity in disciplinary and administrative practices, an increased level of satisfaction with foreign duty assignments, better understanding of the need for high standards of individual conduct, an increased organizational ability to recognize and combat substance abuse problems, improved retention of quality personnel, and the development of a human goals action plan by all Navy units (Weisner, 1973).

These goals stand in some contrast to typical organization development objectives. Golembiewski (1972), in contrasting public sector organization development with traditional efforts, listed these objectives as: locating decision making and problem solving responsibility close to data sources, increasing the self-control and self-direction

of organizational members, supplementing formal authority with knowledge and competence authority, producing a reward system compatible with both mission achievement and continued development, creating an open problem solving throughout the organization, managing the organization by relevant objectives, and increasing the sense of "ownership" of organizational objectives throughout the membership.

Job standardization within the Navy effort has been attempted through a written billet (role) description process, the issuance of operating policy guidelines, a headquarters staff officer assigned to oversee standardization, several representatively attended standardization task group meetings, a common training pipeline, a set of uniform personnel selection criteria, and the requirement for certain prescribed activities to occur within the consultant-client relationship.

Navy organizational development work is repetitious in the sense that the same basic sequence of events (data gathering, diagnosis, intervention, and evaluation) occurs with each client system. Typically, the sequence involves fairly intensive consultant involvement for about eight to twelve weeks within an assigned total possible time frame of eighteen to twenty-four months. New clients generally occur for each consultant team at the rate of one per month. The work also contains elements of uniqueness in that a large proportion of the activities which occur with the client are tailored to its particular needs.

° Structure. The Navy organization development program is only one component of a larger human resource management support system which is also concerned with the areas of equal opportunity/race relations (including women's rights), substance abuse (drugs and alcohol) education and rehabilitation, overseas diplomacy, and leadership and management

training. The program is under the direction and control of the Navy's senior line managers. Its principal operating elements, within a comprehensive worldwide network, are four regionally situated consulting centers reporting directly to various fleet commanders-in-chief. A fifth center located in Washington, D.C., is tasked to serve the Navy's large shore establishment; the Medical Corps and the formal educational system are responsible for staffing and operating their own human resource programs.

The principal work role is that of the human resource management (organization development) specialist which combines some aspects of both the traditionally defined external and internal consultant roles. Specialists, organized into human resource management support (organization development consultation) teams, are assigned by human resource management center commanding officers to particular clients. Clients are made available to centers on a regularly scheduled assignment basis by the fleet commanders. Specialists work with client commanding officers in the primary role of temporary staff assistants. The specialist is responsible both to his or her commanding officer and to the client commanding officer for the quality and completeness of the organization development effort.

Within the semi-flexible constraints imposed by the human resource management cycle the specialists are free to operate as their training and experience levels dictate. They are bound, however, by stringent information disclosure rules that are designed to protect the confidentiality of client generated data at both the level of the individual respondent and the total client organization.

Communications at the consultant-client level are generally considered privileged information. Each consultant strives to establish an open, free flow of data with the client systems he or she serves. Communications flow within many centers is encouraged by case sessions in a diagnostic clinic type format during which the analysis of a particular client effort is presented for peer review.

Responsibility for implementing the organization development program for a particular client is vested in the individual practitioner with a small amount of monitoring by the command structure at each center. Management responsibility for the total systematic effort is located at the apex of the line management hierarchy, in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The actual day-to-day program responsibility is assumed by a senior staff officer, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Human Resource Management (a Rear Admiral). Fleet commanders take responsibility for the organization development efforts under their immediate cognizance.

Authority for conducting the organization development program resides in the written directives of the Chief of Naval Operations (Weisner, 1973). Each center has a written charter that outlines both its responsibilities and authority.

Decision making at the level of the individual client is usually a shared proposition between the assigned specialist and the client's commanding officer. Human Resource Management Center commanding officers operate as semi-autonomous decision makers in the areas of budgeting, resource expenditures,consultant operations, public affairs, client loading, and other locally determined matters. Total system decision making is characteristically conducted on a consultative basis between the office responsible and the subsystems affected.

Reward-punishment systems are primarily those of the traditional Navy. At the level of the individual consultant intrinsic rewards such as challenging work, opportunities for increased professional education, personal growth, and regular promotion are available. Sanctions may include peer disapproval, transfer to other work, poor performance evaluations, oral admonitions by superiors, loss of specialty designation, and formal disciplinary actions.

° People. There are approximately 700 people involved full time in active consultant, administrative, and support positions, including a small percentage of civilians. Of these about 400 are specialists assigned to a human resource management center or detachment. The specialists are about equally divided between middle grade officers (0-3 to 0-5) and senior enlisted ranks (E-6 to E-9) and include in their membership ethnic minorities and women. They are products of a formal twelve week Human Resource Management School conducted under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Naval Education and Training. The school is located at Memphis, Tennessee, and provides basic instruction in both organization development content and process areas as well as Navy program specifics.

The usual tour of duty as a specialist is for three years followed by a reassignment to regular fleet duty in their warfare or occupational specialty. The source of specialists is via the routine personnel assignment process although individuals may voluntarily request this type of duty. Successful consultants are given an organizational coding indicating their consultant expertise which increases the likelihood of a reassignment to human resource management work at a subsequent point in their Navy careers.

A comparative study of work-related values was conducted by the Institute of Social Research for the Navy (Bowers, 1975) using representative samples of 2522 Navy men and 1855 civilians. This study contrasted the most and least important features of a preferred job and achieved a high level of individual factor mean value agreements (within .06) between the two groups. Additional support for the idea that values held by the Navy and the civilian sector are roughly equivalent is provided by research conducted by the Center for Advanced Studies and Analyses, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, (1971) and by Blair and Bachman (1976). Although no reported studies have been made on Navy organization development specialists it can be hypothesized that their value orientations are very similar to those of their Navy contemporaries.

Norms observed among consultants by the author over a six year period include power equalization, shared decision making, credibility based upon knowledge and expertise vice rank, commitment to quality product delivery, candor in professional communications, and confrontation as a problem solving approach.

Consultant leadership styles seem generally to parallel those found in persons of analogous rank in the Navy managerial hierarchy. In a study conducted on a sample of 627 Navy respondents (Kjono, 1976) using the Leadership Effectiveness and Adaptability Questionnaire (LEAD), results indicated that the predominant preferred leadership style was one that was characterized by high task and high relationships behavior. These results compare favorably with LEAD scores from a much larger (over 20,000) data base generated by Hersey and Blanchard (1977) as the style most frequently identified among managers in the United States.

Preliminary research on consultant competency conducted by the McBer Company (McClelland, 1975), at the Navy's request, into motivational patterns of successful Navy organization development specialists revealed some interesting findings. When motive strengths (high, moderate or low) in the areas of need for achievement, need for affiliation, and need for power were analyzed the successful specialists were shown to be moderate in need for achievement, high in need for affiliation, and low in need for power. Successful line managers were determined to have a very different type of motivational profile that consisted of a moderate need for achievement, a low need for affiliation, and a high need for power.

- Technology. The primary organization development technology used in the Navy program is a derivative of the instrumented survey feedback method. Blake and Mouton (1976), in their omnibus work on consultation, classified survey feedback as a catalytic type of intervention strategy. Bowers (1974) concluded, following comparative Navy-civilian research into the effectiveness of various organization development strategies, that the survey feedback methodology would be the maximally useful approach for the majority of the sample tested.

The instrument in use in the Navy program is an eighty-eight question third generation human resource management survey originally developed jointly by the Institute of Social Research and the Navy. It is organized around a causal flow model of organizational functioning and provides Likert-scaled responses in six categories: command climate, supervisory leadership, peer group leadership, work group processes and end results (Hooper, 1976). To date over 300,000 individual surveys have been given in over 1,200 Navy commands.

Once the survey is given, it is computer scored and consultant analyzed. The summarized survey information is fed back to the client organization in a series of meetings with ever descending levels of leadership hierarchy. The data is interpreted by the client organization for relevancy and meaning. Problem and opportunity areas are identified. Data interpretations, along with client felt needs and consultant perceptions, are utilized as inputs to formulate an intervention design.

The design most often takes the form of workshops and consulting services tailored to the client's identified needs. These activities are normally provided by a consultant team during the unit's scheduled five-day human resource availability period. Selected members of the client unit, typically 10-40% of its assigned people, usually travel to the consulting center to participate in these consultant designed activities.

Follow-on services are provided on a mutually agreed upon basis between consultant and client in the time period following the one week's scheduled events. A short, approximately half-day, evaluation session is scheduled with the client unit at about eight to ten months following the availability period. At this time additional services may be contracted for by the client, including a second survey administration, to identify changes. This use of client time seems consistent with current evaluative research into organization development interventions. Porras (1977) suggests that the most effective approach might be client participatory involvement for a period of 16-20 days and a consultant involvement period of 13-24 months.

Aggregated survey data for collective subordinate units are also available upon request to higher echelon organizational commanders to assist in the assessment of their own performance. Normative data, based upon selected organizational samples, are also available to client units for comparative purposes while making their own information-based organizational diagnoses.

The Navy's organization development consultants may also employ specialized technologies such as management by objectives, team building, process consultation, conflict management, leadership style analysis, time management, organizational action planning, communications training, adult learning training, participative management techniques, group decision making facilitation, collaborative problem solving, job enrichment, role clarification, and transactional analysis in the normal course of their work.

The Navy Personnel Research and Development Center in San Diego, California, has been tasked with the responsibility for evaluating the effectiveness of the Navy organization development effort. This activity has initiated survey correlational studies into such diverse organizational variables as operational status reporting systems, maintenance and material control, safety, occupational health, performance awards, unauthorized absences and desertions, and substance abuse. In many cases researcher investigation determined that correlations were impossible due to instabilities and inconsistencies in the measurement of the selected variables themselves. A more comprehensive user-oriented evaluation methodology, as a product of the analysis of human resource availabilities, has been suggested by Highsmith (1976).

The Navy organization development program to date has reached almost 100% of the Navy's first line operational units. It has been able to demonstrate a degree of impact in several key areas of organizational functioning including non-judicial punishment (Crawford and Thomas, 1977), operational performance (Mumford, 1976), and reenlistment rates (Drexler and Bowers, 1974).

"Things go wrong in organizations. Equipment breaks down. Crises destroy the peace. Competitors do the unexpected. And the people are real. They don't move in unison. They have faces. Sometimes they cry. Sometimes they spit." (Leavitt, Dill and Eyring, 1973)

QUANDARIES AND CONUNDRUMS: STICKY WICKETS

Exploration sometimes leads to progress, perhaps more often its path moves toward more questions, into new puzzles and perplexities. So it has been with the Navy's organization development program. Reflective analysis has generated a series of developmental dilemmas as yet largely unanswered and incompletely addressed. Clarification and resolution of these complex questions could have significant impact on the definition and direction of the Navy planned change effort. Although these issues arise out of the Navy organization development experience there are parallel implications for many large organizational system change programs. To assist the reader in abstracting the relevant meaning for his or her type organization the author will list a sampling of the Navy issues and follow each in parentheses with what appears to be the broader large-system question.

1. Navy organization development clients who are entering the human resource management cycle for the second time or more appear to require qualitatively different treatment than those who are appearing for the first time. This creates a concern about how they should be worked with to accommodate their prior exposure and experiences. *(How does an organization development effort change itself to work with increasingly more sophisticated clientele?)*

2. Navy program experience seems to indicate a rough correspondence between client acceptance of consultants and their prior performance as a line officer or senior enlisted person. Consultant skill and knowledge required in a successful human resource management specialist

does not necessarily appear to correlate with previous line performance. *(How does an organization development design using internal change agents balance the need for entry credibility with the client community and the expertise level required of a good consultant?)*

3. Navy consultants are provided an initial short intensive period of training in a highly specialized organization development technology. The demanding delivery schedule for human resource management cycles, coupled with the specialist's relatively short (three years) period as an operational consultant, leaves little time for additional training and technological updating. *(What is the best approach for keeping the busy organization development practitioner abreast of the changing technology in the field and to which of the many developments available will exposure be of the most benefit?)*

4. The turnover of kep people in the Navy organizational development effort has been such that the retention of historical knowledge and perspective has been difficult to achieve. Consequently, resources are consumed and time is lost in attempting efforts and researching decisions that have been previously investigated and analyzed. *(How can provisions be made for retaining an "organizational memory" to prevent "rediscovery of the wheel" in the light of an organization's personnel rotation policies?)*

5. Some tentative preliminary findings into value and motivational patterns for successful Navy organization development consultants indicate a relatively high degree of disparity with the patterns of successful line managers. Additionally, largely anecdotal information gathered over the history of the Navy program indicates the possibility that duty with the human resource management program may produce a much higher

than average incidence of emotional and marital problems in its consultants. *(What happens to the value systems and attitudinal choices of those persons who become involved in organization development work, and are the changes compatible with the continuation of their effective organizational functioning?)*

6. The primary data gathering tool for the Navy organization development program, the human resource management survey, was developed primarily as a descriptive instrument to assess the state of organizational functioning. Survey questions are constructed around the framework contrived for Likert's Survey of Organizations (Taylor, 1972). Because of this framework the Navy survey appears to contain a built-in normative bias toward the "System 4" participative oriented organizational style (Likert, 1960). *(How can an organization development effort select data-gathering modalities that reduce or compensate for built-in normative biases and obtain the most objectively based information possible?)*

7. The Navy has invested considerable resources and maintains a strong commitment in the survey-guided development approach to achieving organizational development. This method has been employed on a mass scale for over three and one-half years with only relatively minor evolutionary modifications to its basic techniques. Some Navy commanders have bona fide objections to the use of a survey as means of gathering attitudinal information within their organizations. These complaints include: the intrusiveness of the questions asked, the time demands involved for the respondents, the seeming irrelevancy of the data requested to individual and organizational functioning, generation of the expectation that survey results will lead to actual changes, over-simplification of issues, inability to account for unique local conditions, and not checking to see

if managements needs are being met (Baldwin, 1975). Additionally, significant questions concerning the appropriateness of a second go-around using the same survey approach have arisen in both the specialist and client communities. *(When does large-scale capital investment in a basic organization development approach become counter-productive for the investigation of other methods? How does such investment prejudice the decision for a timely succession by a more advanced technology?)*

8. Much of the impetus toward producing a Navy organization planned change program came from forces in the larger society pressing for improvements in the social "good." The organizational effectiveness and efficiency of Defense Department programs have been traditionally tied to measurable increases in mission effectiveness and personnel morale. The Navy organization development program finds itself in the ambiguous situation of attempting to respond to both pressures for improving both the social good and the level of task performance. *(To what extent should an organization development program become involved in advocating and articulating organizational changes justified by enhancing social progress versus those changes resulting more directly in better mission achievement?)*

9. Demonstrating cause and effect relationships has been the cornerstone in justifying the initiation and continuance of programs both within and without the Navy for some years. Research into assessing organizational functioning has uncovered a multiplicity of input, intervening and output variables involved in a complex interaction. The Navy organization development program, after some initially sheltered years, is under heavy scrutiny to demonstrate its continued impact in terms that make sense to the resource allocators. *(In an evaluation*

environment oriented toward demonstrating single-cause/single-effect relationships, how do multiple-cause/multiple-effect organizational improvement programs prove their worth?)

10. The early Navy Programmatic effort was criticized because of its length, use of a skilled labor-intensive approach, and ability to reach only a small segment of the entire system. Overall system impact, in particular, was considered to be a high priority goal of the developmental effort. Voluntary client exposure had been shown to be incapable of producing the volume of clients needed to produce perceptible constructive change in the total Navy system, so a mandatory requirement for participation was instituted. *(What are the cost/benefit considerations in a large system change effort for either voluntary or required participation by its members?)*

11. Although most organization development literature indicates system change results require three to five years to appear, the Navy leadership structure has pressed for relatively immediate demonstrations of effectiveness. The Navy resource allocation system appears to be such that justification for program expenditures must be related on a year-by-year basis and is subject to extra-Navy review [i.e., Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and Congress]. *(Since demonstrations of large system change impact are generally conceded to be a relatively long term procedure, how can short and medium results be planned to assure program survival?)*

"--We learn that 'OD' is alive and recuperating in Foggy Bottom." (Bennis, 1974)

LESSONS LEARNED: PAINFUL EDUCATION

In the course of almost six and one-half years of experience with the Navy large-system change effort certain lessons seem to loom larger than life from their background as adjudged successes or failures. These lessons were usually the result of painful experience and it was most often in the overcoming of the pain that the knowledge of their significance occurred. Once again, as in the preceding section, an attempt is made to generalize from the specifics of the Navy experience to the larger context of large-system change.

1. The pressures of a continuing cycle of clients, limited duration of professional training, and individual consultant proclivities and talents have produced some tendencies toward a mismatch between the diagnostic results of the Navy survey instrument and the activities of the human resource availability week. The dictates of what should occur as a consequence of developed data interpretations and the availability designs prepared and delivered by the human resource management specialist are not always consistent. *(The effectiveness of a developmental effort may suffer when the "diagnosis" is not well related to the "treatment.")*

2. Navy senior enlisted persons have, in general, performed superbly as organization development consultants. They have, after some initial officer leadership reluctance, been able to operate successfully as consultants tc Navy commanding officers far superior in rank. *(Do not overlook the possibility of using first line supervisors as change agents in a large-system development program, they bring a credibility and knowledge which is acceptable to both management and work-*

force alike.) For example, Joe Scanlon, father of the Scanlon Plan of participative management, was most effective with both management and unions because of his shop experience.

3. The Navy program experienced largely unexpected resistance to its image as a facilitator of improved organizational effectiveness as a consequence of its early violation of a number of the organization's traditional norms and customs. The attiring of consultants in civilian clothing, using informal egalitarian modes of address between officers and enlisted persons, relying heavily on non-career identified consultants, longer than usual haircut styles, and attempts at democratic organizational forms all seemed to produce consequences dysfunctional to the program's change goals. *(Effective internal organizational consultants need to be able to appear initially to be enough like their clients in outward appearance, speech, and organizational goal identification so as to be acceptable to them; but enough different in attitudes and knowledge so as to be seen having something useful to offer. Over time the external presentation of the successful consultant seems to count much less than his or her ability to provide meaningful assistance in the eyes of the client system.)*

4. The Navy organization development program injected a heavy dose of money, people, facilities, and demonstrations of top level commitment into its organizational system over a relatively short time. This infusion seemed to generate and sustain the momentum of the developmental effort despite a major change in the top level administration and support structure. *(The phenomenon of bureaucratic inertia seems to be particularly operative in a large organizational system. If it is possible to get the organizational system moving with some degree of acceleration, even with powerful opposition, it will take some time to stop and reverse the newly established trend.)*

5. The initial reaction of the Navy's top leadership layers to

an organizational development approach was to consider it highly appropriate for the lower level operational units but not very appropriate for improving their own level of functioning. It required consistent demonstrations of effect among the operational units, coupled with relevant information gathering techniques (aggregated survey data for subordinate units) to generate some degree of interest and real support among the Navy's higher command levels. *(There will be a tendency for top leadership in a large system to require recognizable proof of results prior to commiting their own level in an organization development program.)*

6. The Navy effort, despite support and encouragement from the highest organizational levels, encountered the most difficulty from within the middle management and supervisory ranks. The general perception of the middle levels of the Navy organization was that organization development was not their program but just another competing demand upon their time and energy imposed from the top of the bureaucratic pyramid. *(An organization development program to enjoy system-wide success must plan to obtain the active involvement of the middle and supervisory levels as well as the support of top management.)*

7. A foundation stone of the Navy system development program is the providing of organizational consultative assistance to those persons in charge of its principal components. Protection of the confidentiality of the diagnostic data generated in the consultative relationship has been guaranteed by top management edict. The continued guarantee of confidentiality, especially in the light of unsuccessful attempts to breach it from within the organizational structure, has provided the Navy organization development program with a high degree of client credibility. *(It appears to be important for the success of an organization*

development effort that its change agents be viewed by potential clients as helpful resources and not as inspectors providing a "report card" to higher authority.)

8. During the evolution of the Navy organization development effort a spectrum of change designs from the highly structured to the highly flexible were tried. Extremes were found to be generally ineffective in the large Navy system. The high structure designs were diffcult to adjust to the great functional diversity of Navy units and the varying tempo of their operational environments. The high flexibility designs required a great degree of consultant sophistication, produced inconsistent outcomes, made it difficult to allocate limited specialist resources, and generated problems in assessing overall systemic impact. *(The balance between structure and flexibility in a large system-planned change design is likely to be a significant consideration bearing on the success of the effort.)*

"The Peter Probability: The scientific method, your true gift of prophecy, only shows you the approximate shape of things to come."
(Peter, 1972)

PROLEPSIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The Navy organization development program shows strong signs of moving out of its present stage of consolidation and institutionalization. This current period of little visible change was preceded by earlier phases of planting, sprouting, and rapid growth. The next stage is likely to be one of slow controlled metamorphosis with careful regard for environmental conditions. In view of present trends and anticipated future events it appears likely that:

° The goals of the Human Resource Management Support System (large-system change objectives) will be translated into more measurable organizational effectiveness objectives that can form the basis of a relevant evaluation system.

° A mechanism will be developed for better information sharing among the various components of the organization development system at the operational and practitioner level. A computer based management information system, joint problem task forces, and system-wide symposiums will become common.

° There will be a need for greater flexibility of program delivery in terms of type and intensity of activities and with whom and at what times they will be conducted. This will be offset, somewhat, by increased requirements for standardization. Clients will have an increased voice in what they are to receive and how they will obtain it.

° Organizational task, structure, and technological problems and opportunities will receive increasing program emphasis as well as people-oriented processes. Increased cooperation with other Navy activities

involved with achieving constructive change in these new areas will be brought about through recognition of shared interest.

° The Navy organization development program will face a continued drain on its level of expertise and experience as the initial cadre of practitioners and administrators leave the system. This drain will be particularly acute in the area of senior enlisted practitioners. The losses will be partially offset by the introduction of graduates from the Naval Postgraduate School Master's Degree Program in Human Resource Management and officers returning to the program after a tour of operational duty.

° The Navy Leadership and Management Education and Training program will grow into a more comprehensive management development system and become an integral component of the overall organization improvement effort.

° Increased pressure will be generated toward inter-service sharing of knowledge and resources as an attempt to control mounting costs and overlap of effort. There will be higher levels of practitioner cross training, movement toward a common postgraduate education center, and cooperation on joint-service organization development projects.

° Training in conflict-resolution techniques will be offered increasingly as one mechanism to deal with the threat of military unionization.

° A Navy Applied Human Resource Management Research Institute will be established to bridge the gap between the primarily basic organizational research currently conducted and the needs of the practitioner for workable new tools and techniques. A closer working relationship will occur among governmental and civilian activities engaged in organization development research; organization development research will become routinely incorporated into the Navy's long-range research planning and

budgeting process.

° Evaluative data developed from the Navy organization development program will be increasingly keyed to the specialized requirements of different types and levels of decision makers and resource allocators. The different constituencies needing assessment information will be carefully identified and supplied the level of statistically or subjectively based data that they actually require.

° A comprehensive attempt will be made to synthesize and transform currently available evaluation research into impact data on top management articulated overall Navy change targets.

° The human resource management data bank will be utilized to identify trends in Navy organizational system functioning. Recommendations for possible policy and operations changes will be proposed to higher Navy leadership on the basis of an analysis of the trends.

In general, the future of organization development in the Navy looks like a time for evolution and not revolution; a period of increasing maturity and acceptance. It should also be a time in which the personnel and technical priorities of the Navy reach an equitable balance; a time when the interdependence of task, structure, people, and technology becomes an acknowledged reality.

"'Twas a difficult task for my logical mind, but the chief taught me all that he knew about orbital prose, multinegative cues, and adjustive subliminal views." (Boren, 1972)

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: IN THE WAKE OF THE PROGRAM

Why all this fuss about planning for change in large organizational systems? It has been proposed by several respected organizational commentators (Gardner, 1966; Bennis, 1966; and Lippitt, 1970) that large organizations, without a built-in renewal and self-reformation process, may be doomed to become ever more devitalized and increasingly less efficient. At least one writer suggests that the fate of gargantuan organizations may be even more serious - eventual extinction like the prehistoric dinosaurs. Connellan (1976), to explain this phenomenon of large system decay, proposes what he calls the "Brontosaurus Principle." The principle states that "Organizations can grow faster than their brains can manage them in relation to their environment and to their own physiology: when this occurs they are an endangered species."

I would suggest a more commonplace and pragmatic answer to the question of why to become involved with large system organization development-improved effectiveness. Rear Admiral Charles Rauch, formerly head of the Navy's Human Resource Management Project, has indicated that improved effectiveness is the real goal of the Navy organization development program. Admiral Rauch stated, "...its purpose (the Human Resource Management Program) is to improve the Navy's operational effectiveness..." (Rauch, 1976). Since there appears to be almost as much confusion and contention about the word effectiveness as there is about definitions of organization development, for purposes of this

paper effectiveness will be defined as the product of three interdependent factors: purpose accomplishment, member satisfaction, and survival. (Forbes, 1976). Therefore the payoff for the high price of large-system investment in a planned change development should be measurable improvements in: (1) mission and task achievement, (2) the satisfaction levels of people, and (3) the probability of its survival.

Given that a strategy to improve large system organizational effectiveness is a worthwhile endeavor, is organization development the best way to undertake the effort? Increasingly organizational researchers are asking questions like this in articles such as "Can OD be Fine-Tuned to Bureaucracies?" (Greiner and Schein, 1977). What is the evidence?

Historically, the Navy's attempt at large system organization development compares favorably in terms of size, duration, and degree of success with other such efforts within the Federal bureaucracy. The State Department (Marrow, 1974), the U.S. Army Chaplaincy (Mill, 1974), and the Bureau of Reclamation (Farrell, 1973) among others, have tried large-scale planned change programs with varying degrees of success. In the private sector TRW Systems (Davis, 1969), SAGA (Crockett, 1972), Texas Instruments (Rush, 1972), and Harwood Manufacturing (Marrow, 1967) are representative of having developed large system change programs.

Several social commentators (Strickland, 1970; Toffler, 1970; and Newman, 1973) have theorized that the accelerating rate of change, particularly in the technological sphere, has created large scale social problems. As a consequence of such rapid changes the advance of technology has made solving hardware problems much easier and social

problems more difficult than ever before, The logical extension of this way of thinking is that the answers to social and political questions are to be found in more complex hardware, However, there is some evidence to suggest that what has been learned through attempting to resolve complex large system organizational issues may greatly contribute to the resolution of technical problems (Sayles, 1971). Research into the diffusion of important technological or scientific findings from inception to use indicates a typical five to ten year time lag (McClelland, 1968). In particular, what we are learning from the Navy organization development effort about how various technological and social subsystems interact and influence each other, may have important implications for the successful management of complex hardware projects.

It has been said with some conviction that we have achieved limited penetration into the planned changing of macro-systems (Benne, 1976). In terms of a planned change strategy for a large system, the Navy effort might be called the "penicillin" approach. The underlying assumptions seem to be that: (1) the Navy system in general suffers from a number of specified and unspecified complaints that hamper its organizational health; (2) the development and administration of a broad spectrum anti-symptom vaccine is the treatment of choice; (3) that the worker levels should get the treatment first (because that's where the action is, and the higher levels already possess some immunity); (4) that the results will be justified through some detectable improvement in the health of the majority of cases (the average incidences of the key symptoms will be reduced); (5) that some remarkable "cures" will occur to provide immediate justification of the

developmental costs incurred; and (6) that the level of treatment "rejections" and negative side effects are manageable. It is also helpful to the adoption of this strategy that the treatment can be professionally designed and tested; is able to be mass produced in standardized units; can be quality controlled; is easily given by para-professionals; can cover a wide band of known ills; and can reach a large population quickly. Some questions that arise concerning utilizing the penicillin approach are: To what extent does everyone need it? Are there currently better treatments available? Do we really know under what conditions it is best employed? Is it cost effective? How do we know if it's really working or not? How can we minimize the bad side effects?

The Navy has also opted for "institutionalization" as a means of keeping the concept and practice of organization development alive within the organization itself. The decision to utilize institutionalization as a planned-change program survival-strategy appears, in retrospect, to have been predicated on a series of advantages that were likely to accrue if it was successful. Among these advantages are: the development of a wider base of organizational support for the effort through active participation; incorporation of organization development ideas and principles into the Navy's routine way of conducting business; increasing program ownership by making line authority accountable for achieving results in improved organizational functioning; the potential for reaching the mainstream organizational audience; making supportive resource allocation a regular and accepted function; and establishing the effort as a historically based precedent difficult to easily alter.

Institutionalization, when compared to the earlier project-type approach, can also be seen to have had some distinct disadvantages as a survival promoting organization development strategy. A few of the more notable program costs appear to have been:

- A reduced program priority - lower level organizational commanders now establish their own relative priorities among a wide variety of competing programs.
- Less visibility with top management - a reduced level of direct commander interest and support caused by a greater decentralization of responsibility and authority.
- A loss of resource allocation protection - money and people supplies are now subjected to the competition of the internal marketplace.
- An increased need for integrative organizational mechanisms - a more highly differentiated organization structure necessitates more time and energy involvement in coordination activities.
- A lower level of innovation - emphasis is upon operational productivity and quantity not creativity.
- Less adaptability and flexibility - increased pressures to conform to established rules and procedures.
- Longer timeframes for implementing system-wide decisions - a greater number and diversity of suborganization units must agree prior to implementation.
- An erosion of common vision - a greater number of component subsystems are providing their own unique interpretations and meanings of the intent of the effort.

Perhaps one potentially useful way to view the Navy system change effort is to see it as a series of growth stages. One such viewpoint comes out of the literature of group dynamics. Four relatively distinct developmental stages in the evolution of a successful task group in relating to authority figures is described by Jones (1973). The Navy program has proceeded through periods of dependence (the pilot group phase), conflict (the early project office phase), cohesion (the staff program phase), and interdependence (the institutionalization phase).

The developmental effort also bears a strong resemblance to the stages of corporate growth first articulated by Blake, Avis, and Mouton (1966). These authors hypothesized that the typically successful business proceeded through a recognizable series of growth stages. The first stage was entrepreneurship; the initial rapid growth of an organization through the efforts of an individual or small group in identifying and meeting an environmental need, which corresponds to the work of the Navy human resource management pilot group. The second stage, called the mechanistic corporation, is characterized by the development of systems, practices, and traditions applied to operations in a mechanical way; roughly corresponding to the Navy's command development and human resource management cycle programs. The final stage of corporate growth is called the dynamic corporation and is recognizable by the retention of systematic practices and the restoration of organizational vigor as well as the promulgation of widely known organizational objectives and energetic commitment of the membership to the organization's purposes. In my judgment, the Navy program seems currently to be poised between the mechanistic and dynamic corporate stages and seems to be very unclear as to how to move on to the next stage.

One danger to that next stage movement is contained in the words "group think." Group think is a phenomenon described by Janis (1972) that places the need of a cohesive group to move toward consensus at the expense of critical thinking. This tendency places a higher value upon decision acceptance than upon decision quality. It is characterized by decision makers' illusions of invulnerability, their illusion of unanimity, a suppression of personal doubts and by self-appointed mindguards.

Many of the decisions of consequence in the Human Resource Management Support System are the products of group thought, either directly as in the form of task groups or more indirectly through staff study recommendations. What this suggests is that care be exercised in taking the next major organization development step in the Navy system; that respect for one anothers reputations and opinions not lead us to believe they are necessarily true; that personal doubts concerning proposed courses of actions be allowed to surface and be examined; that we not be lulled into believing that all are committed to and will earnestly support the decision group's selected alternative; and that we resist, when conscience requires, those direct and subtle pressures for group conformity. What the organization development program most needs at this critical time are both effective individual and group decisions, those that reflect both high quality and high acceptability.

The present status of the Navy organization development program is, in my estimation, best characterized by attempts to reduce a condition of moderate-to-high uncertainty. The uncertainty seems to center around long-term program goals, how to best realize the goals, making the effort more responsive to the client's felt needs, demonstration of

program impact, and better utilization of assigned resources. The Navy program's leadership appears to be in the very early stages of determining how to move toward replacing the ambiguity with improved structure and processes.

From the perspective of a "grandfather" participant-observer in the Navy organization development effort I would like to propose a series of recommendations aimed at enhancing its own self-renewal. These recommendations are shown in Table One. This listing is not intended to be all inclusive, but to suggest some concrete ways in which the present program might be improved. Most of the recommendations could be enacted under the Navy system's present level of autonomy and control of required resources.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE NAVY HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT EFFORT

ISSUE	GOAL	RECOMMENDATION
TASK RELATED		
A. Lack of clear cut, well defined program objectives.	1. A prioritized listing of externally focused human resource management support system objectives that relate to improving operational performance.	1a. Solicit "like to see" objectives from major claimants, consolidate into one listing; submit the listing for claimant review and comment; incorporate comments into measurable objectives; obtain sponsor approval; and widely promulgate.
	2. A prioritized listing of internally focused human resource management support system objectives that relate improving system effectiveness.	2a. After publication of external objectives, solicit "like to see" objectives from system components; consolidate into one listing; submit the listing for internal system review and comment; develop measurable internal objectives from review results; obtain sponsor approval and promulgate.
B. Lack of a comprehensive, overall evaluation plan.	3. Produce an integrated assessment plan designed to measure impact on identified human resource management objectives.	3a. Assign an internal system task force to determine: (1) What type evaluation data is needed and by whom; (2) What has already been done; (3) What we should actually measure; (4) Who is best equipped to do the assessments and when; and (5) A recommended plan of action for an overall evaluation system.
C. No really adequate mechanism exists for identifying significant issues of broad concern arising from Human Resource Management Cycles.	4. Establish a procedure that can identify broadly-based organizational issues requiring higher echelon attention, while assuring confidentiality of source, coming out of Human Resource Management Cycles.	4a. Task HRMC/D Commanding Officers to report widely founded issues of probable interest to senior commanders. 4b. Fund the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center to perform data bank trend analysis and report results to fleet commanders.

STRUCTURE RELATED

A. A need exists for translating Human Resource Management related research information into an organizationally useful form.	5. Organize a human resource unit specifically charged with assessing research developments, conducting applied research experiments, and developing new technology for practitioner use.	5a. Charter a Navy Human Resource Management Institute. Staff it with people who have the capability to understand and deal in both the worlds of research and operational human resource management.
B. The Navy Leadership and Management program is not well coordinated with the organization development effort.	6. Create better linking systems between leadership and management training and the organization development effort.	6a. Cross-train some Human Resource Management Specialists in Leadership and Management Training. 6b. Authorize direct liaison between HRMC/D's and LMT sites. 6c. Investigate ways at the Washington Staff level (PERS 62) for further coordinating the efforts of the two programs.
C. Information relating to improving the performance of the Human Resource Management Support System is not adequately shared among its component organizations. Organization development practitioners in geographically distant units are not adequately sharing new tools, techniques, and lessons learned to improve their level of individual and team consulting performance.	7. Create a data sharing system that will communicate relevant performance-related information among the units of the Human Resource Management System requiring it.	7a. Design, test and implement a computer based Human Resource Management Support System information network. 7b. Schedule practitioner-oriented symposia at least twice per year to exchange and update performance-oriented information as well as to identify additional sources of knowledge and mutual assistance.
D. Increased opportunities to provide useful consulting help are likely to occur in the area of conflict management between superior-subordinate, peer-peer, and unit-environment groups as the Human Resource management approach gains wider Navy acceptance (particularly in view of the spectre of military unionization.)	8. Provide Navy consultants with an increased capability to deal in the area of conflict management.	8a. Design and deliver practitioner oriented skill training in the area of organizational conflict management.

E. Consultant organizational diagnoses are not always well connected to designed interventions reducing the effectiveness of the Human Resource Management Cycle. Specialists generally do not appear to be familiar with the full capability of the Human Resource Management Survey nor how to employ diagnostic data in the design of the availability week.	9. Provide additional knowledge and skill in the areas of diagnosis and intervention design to the Human Resource Management specialist.	9a. Design and implement improved basic training in survey-based organizational diagnosis. 9b. Make available the services of skilled case reviewers to assist consultant teams in raising the level of their diagnostic expertise. 9c. Conduct follow-on field site training in instrument-based diagnosis as well as in diagnostic alternatives. 9d. Design and implement basic school training in translating survey interpretations into educational and performance objectives. 9e. Conduct field site training in availability-week design and delivery. 9f. Make available expert on-the-job consultant assistance to consultant teams during the Human Resource Management cycle stages concerned with availability design and delivery.
PEOPLE RELATED		
A. The overall knowledge and competence level of the Human Resource Management System appears to be steadily declining. Experienced, difficult to replace, resources are being steadily rotated out of the system.	10. Provide the Navy Human Resource Management Support System with the minimum required level of human competence on a regular basis.	10a. Alter personnel rotation policies to permit a small percentage (20%) of highly selected individuals to remain continuously within the Human Resource Management Support System for a career.
B. Other military services have created organization development programs of potential utility to the Navy as well as competent practitioners.	11. Share human assets in the organization development effort across the services.	11a. Obtain and utilize quotas at the U.S. Army's Organizational Effectiveness Officer Training Program. 11b. Exchange officers on a temporary additional duty basis between the U.S. Air Force Leadership Center and an HRMC.

		or billet in Human Resource Management at the Naval Postgraduate School. 11d. Obtain additional non-Navy inputs to the Human Resource Management Master's Degree program at the Naval Postgraduate School. 11e. Initiate exchange field site visits between Army Organization Effectiveness Staff Officers and Navy Human Resource Management Specialists.
C. Increasing numbers of subjective reports from both within the Navy organization development effort and from civilian practitioners indicate that performing this type of work can have significant emotional and familial consequences (i.e., phenomenon of consultant "burnout" and incidences of marital difficulties).	12. Investigate and report on the relationship between duty in Human Resource Management consultant assignments and identifiable emotional and value changes.	12a. Identify, task, and fund an applied research project on emotional and value changes as a consequence of assignment as a Human Resource Management specialist. (Suggest the Naval Health Research Center as a likely candidate.)
TECHNOLOGY RELATED A. Client comments and specialist inputs indicate that the survey-guided development approach is not appropriate or useful with all Navy units (particularly small staffs).	13. Provide the most appropriate and available organization development technology for use with Navy organizations.	13a. Investigate and test promising alternatives to survey-guided development. 13b. Conduct research into how to select the most appropriate organization development technology to use with a given client system.
B. There is an apparent lack of a workable mechanism for evaluating and disseminating new technological advances generated both within and without the Human Resource Management Support System.	14. Create a workable mechanism for identifying, testing, and disseminating relevant advances in organization development technology.	14a. Authorize direct liaison between the Navy Human Resource Management Institute (Item 5a.) and HRMC D's in addition to the research community.

"Finagle's Law"

The information we have is not what we want;
the information we want is not what we need;
and the information we need is not available."
(Golde, 1976)

SUMMARY

In this paper we have explored the form and substance of the Navy's effort in system-wide planned change. The effort is probably better described as an ongoing organizational experiment - for all the results are not yet in. Its history is rooted in the sociology of American life in the early seventies, its present scale and sweep the product of the imagination and commitment of a small leadership group.

Beginning as an action-research task group, the Navy program in organization development found strong support in a change-oriented top management team. As a systematic strategy for organizational change in a tradition-oriented authoritarian structure, it synthesized for its own use an eclectic grab-bag of working organization development technology. This technology was shaped into a step-sequenced development program that could be used with a wide variety of Navy units.

The initial highly structured change program called "Command Development" was tested, refined, and ultimately found wanting. Its principal faults were that it couldn't reach enough people, soon enough, with enough impact. It required too much time, lacked clear definition of purpose, and had a narrow base of organizational support. What was needed was a program that could be easily assimilated by the organizational structure, had the potential for improving organizational performance in key areas, and had a high probability of long term survival.

A second generation organization development approach titled, "The Human Resource Management Cycle," was designed to correct these deficiencies.

Its principal feature was an instrument-based methodology to diagnosing organizational functioning labelled, "Survey-guided Development." This new approach was a prescribed, scheduled, semi-structured sequence of events aimed at the Navy's operating forces. It has since become an institutionalized organizational process largely through the advocacy and efforts of its Navy sponsors.

At present the program has touched most of the working levels of the Navy and has begun to be used at higher management levels in the command structure. Its success has been difficult to measure and its change approach is controversial, gaining both high-echelon supporters and detractors. Perhaps the best indicators of its current worth to the organization are that it continues to receive required resources in the form of money and people, it is the object of supportive statements before Congressional committees, and that it commands a place on busy operational schedules.

The six-year growth of the Navy organization development program has paralleled that of an evolving human being. It has experienced pangs of birth, a protected infancy, an exploratory childhood, a troubled adolescence, and now stands on the brink of its maturity. It has learned most of its lessons the hard way and is now faced with the value-laden dilemmas of adulthood. It is hoped that what the Navy program has experienced will not only benefit itself in terms of the choices it makes about the future but also to provide useful information to other large systems either contemplating or now actively engaged in the throes of an organization development effort.

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